



National Strategy

For the Special Constabulary_March 2008

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FOREWORD FROM TONY MCNULTY MP




This, the first National Strategy for the Special Constabulary, has established that

there is a real need for this body in modern policing. I am pleased to note that the growth in numbers of Special Constables has proved to be such a success in terms of achieving a positive approach towards improving operational performance and increasing levels of public satisfaction. The Strategy also recognises the valuable contribution which Specials have made to Neighbourhood Policing, a mission-critical programme. The Home Office, ACPO, APA and NPIA, working together with communities across England and Wales, have made real progress in raising public expectations. This strategy provides an excellent opportunity to find new ways to support forces in standardising training and deployment procedures for Specials.

Tony McNulty MP,
Home Office Minister of State
for Security, Counter-terrorism,
Crime and Policing

FOREWORD FROM PETER FAHY



It has been a huge privilege to work with chief officers of the Special Constabulary

on this first national strategy. The growth in the number of Special Constables over recent years has been a real success story. Through the strategy we have tried to ensure that the work of all Specials is well focused on neighbourhood policing and recognises the particular contribution volunteers can make. There is no other public service that benefits from volunteers in this way and takes them so enthusiastically into the heart of the operation. The Special Constabulary has risen to the challenge of rising public expectations and the need for effective public engagement. These are very special people carrying out a very special form of public service.

Peter Fahy,
Spokesman for ACPO

FOREWORD FROM PETER NEYROUD



The Special Constabulary is a crucial aspect of policing in England and

Wales. As it states in the strategy, 'As a business proposition, the Special Constabulary is difficult to beat.' Whether in my previous role as Chief of Thames Valley Police or as CEO of the NPIA, I know this to be the case and I am fully committed to supporting its future development – indeed, I am personally encouraging people within the Agency who might wish to join the Special Constabulary. As highlighted in the work of the independent Review of Policing by Sir Ronnie Flanagan, sustaining Neighbourhood Policing is one of the most important things that we should be doing, now and in the future. The continued development of the Special Constabulary is a crucial part of that, and of ensuring the future success of policing in general.

Peter Neyroud,
Chief Executive of the NPIA



Avon & Somerset	Leicestershire
Bedfordshire	Lincolnshire
Cambridgeshire	Merseyside
Cheshire	Metropolitan
City of London	Norfolk
Cleveland	Northamptonshire
Cumbria	Northumbria
Derbyshire	North Wales
Devon & Cornwall	North Yorkshire
Dorset	Nottinghamshire
Durham	South Wales
Dyfed-Powys	South Yorkshire
Essex	Staffordshire
Gloucestershire	Suffolk
Greater Manchester	Surrey
Gwent	Sussex
Hampshire	Thames Valley
Hertfordshire	Warwickshire
Humberside	West Mercia
Kent	West Midlands
Lancashire	West Yorkshire
	Wiltshire

43 Constabularies

At 14,021 in England and Wales, the Special Constabulary now equates to about 9% of the number of full time equivalent regular officers.

Executive Summary

The Special Constabulary is a part-time, volunteer body consisting of officers with full police powers. Officers are available mainly in the evening and at weekends except in times of emergency. It has a long and impressive history and has recently benefited significantly from increased interest and investment.

Numbers have grown over the past two years with considerable direct support initially from the Home Office, and this represents a major success for the Home Office decision to provide ring-fenced funding for the Capacity Growth Initiative. At the end of March 2007 the numbers were 14,021, which equated to about 9% of the number of full time equivalent regular officers.

The Special Constabulary is far more representative of the community than the Regular Officers – not only by gender and ethnic background but by socio-economic group. Recruitment is further strengthening diversity, but even at this point 32% are female (compared to 21% for regular officers) and 6% are from ethnic minorities (compared to 3.5% for regular officers). The Special Constabulary is therefore an excellent bridge between the Police Service and the public, representing both the community within the Police Service and the Police Service within the community. Special Constables are highly cost-effective – the total cost per duty hour is estimated at £3.40 in the first two years and less than £3 per hour after that, or about 10% of the hourly cost of a regular officer and a fraction of the cost of a Community Support Officer.

The environment in which the Special Constabulary operates is changing rapidly. New entities such as PCSOs, Highways Agency Traffic Officers, Vehicle Inspectorate Staff and even private security firms are taking over roles traditionally carried out by police officers. The Serious and Organised Crime Agency is now in place to deal with national threats to the community. Initiatives such as Neighbourhood Policing are transforming the way services are delivered locally. Against that background, a team of Special Chief Officers was given the task of determining whether there is a role for the Special Constabulary in this new structure and, if so, what that role should be. The team


worked with representatives of the Home Office, ACPO, HMIC and the Neighbourhood Policing Project team, but this is essentially a Special Constabulary strategy for the Special Constabulary.

The basic premise of the approach used is that the demand for policing services can be analysed like any other ‘market’ and providers of service can be considered in the same way as ‘suppliers’ in other markets. The demand for police services seems to be an expanding market with no apparent limit to its growth. However, like any other market it has recognisable segments and niches. While real progress is being made in most segments, others are under-resourced and performance levels in these are not good enough to satisfy public demand. The Special Constabulary can be a key part of the solution in tackling these segments and improving both operating performance and public satisfaction with the police.

As a business proposition the Special Constabulary is difficult to beat. Not only is it extraordinarily cost-effective, but it is more representative of the community

(socio-economic groups and businesses) than any other body delivering policing services. It therefore brings greater involvement and improved communication with members of the public and the business community. Specials can act as a positive force for change – bringing with them an extensive pool of skills, talents, experience, local knowledge and diverse backgrounds – as well as enhancing the level of service provided by the police.

The opportunity is described in this Report and Chief Officers are encouraged to use it to see the Special Constabulary in their respective Forces as a strategic resource to improve performance – wherever the need is greatest and the fit with the Special Constabulary’s strengths are greatest.





01 Introduction and Background

The Special Constabulary has a long and proud history dating back hundreds of years. Its organised era stems from an 1831 Act of Parliament and the service celebrated its 175th anniversary in 2006. However, the Police Service is changing rapidly to reflect changes in society and new providers are being created or are entering the 'market'.

New approaches are being used and new technology is being deployed. Against that background, every aspect of policing is being challenged and tested for relevance and value for money. The Special Constabulary has no right to continue unless it serves a real and distinct purpose and that fact is recognised by most who serve within it.

It was against that background that Special Chief Officers from around the country met at Bramshill in November 2005. While the purpose of the meeting was to consider the implications of the Neighbourhood Policing initiative and how the Special Constabulary should support it, the debate widened and it was decided to take a fundamental look at the future of the institution if, indeed, it should have a future.

A team of senior Special Constabulary officers drawn from around the country, representing large and small, urban and rural communities, was formed to consider the future. The questions being addressed were profound. Is there a real need for the Special Constabulary as a provider of policing services? If so, is there a differentiated role for the Special Constabulary or should it be seen purely as a source of additional staffing at times of peak need? Lastly, does the Special Constabulary represent value for money, or should the investment be put into other providers that are more cost-effective?

The result of the Working Group's study was presented to the National Conference on the Special Constabulary in March 2006. Specials' representatives from 42 of the 43 Home Office Police Forces, and British Transport Police, considered the findings,

conclusions and recommendations of the study and unanimously approved the strategy. The output has also been reviewed by the Home Office and by Mr Peter Fahy, Chief Constable of Cheshire Constabulary and the ACPO lead on the Special Constabulary. It has universal support from across that group and its implementation is considered a priority.

This document describes how the study, in 2006, was carried out using techniques developed in business and not usually seen in the police service. It describes its conclusions – the principal one being that the Special Constabulary has a unique opportunity to play a valuable, cost-effective and differentiated role integrated with and alongside, but distinct from, the other providers of service to the community. It then sets out the priorities for the implementation of the strategy.

While the way forward at a national level is clear, this is not a one-size-fits-all solution. The principles should apply to every Force area, and most of the recommended strategy can be adopted universally. However, the same methodology used to develop the national strategy can be used to focus Specials on the local priorities in each community while remaining true to the principles set out here. It is essential that the strategy is adopted nationally and enhanced and adapted, not diluted, locally. The size, development and deployment of the Special Constabulary will be the subject of future inspections by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary because the effective use of the Special Constabulary is an issue in Force efficiency and value for money.

The Special Constabulary has a unique opportunity to play a valuable, cost-effective and differentiated role



02 Terms of Reference and Influencing Factors

The purpose of this National Strategy Review was firstly to establish whether there was an ongoing need for the Special Constabulary in modern policing. In the event that a real need was proved, the second question was whether the Special Constabulary could be shown to be effective and cost-efficient.

Should the answers to these questions be positive, the Review was to determine how the Special Constabulary could be best deployed to have the maximum impact on areas of community concern, recognising its unique advantages and constraints. Finally, the Review had to consider the main changes required to implement the strategy and identify the action required to implement the recommendations.

Objective

This Strategy is not intended to provide a one-size-fits-all solution. Instead, it provides a framework that Forces can utilise to ensure their Special Constabularies are being used effectively and efficiently and are being focused on the areas where they can add most value. While many of the recommended areas for deployment will apply to most Forces it is recognised that circumstances and needs vary widely, and the key to success is using the Special Constabulary as a highly cost-effective resource that can be of outstanding value if properly directed and managed.

Starting Point – A Rapidly Changing Environment

To answer the question ‘is there a role for the Special Constabulary in modern policing?’ the study needed to consider a number of key factors. These included the modern police environment, key stakeholders and their requirements, current personnel

statistics for the Special Constabulary and the costs. Details of the factors that were taken into account are shown in Appendix I.

Key Stakeholders

The Special Constabulary recognises that, as with any organisation, being successful means satisfying our key stakeholders. Our key stakeholders have been identified as:

- Home Office
- Association of Chief Police Officers
- Police Forces (Chief Constables and ACPO members)
- Police Authorities
- Special Constables
- Communities across England and Wales
- Police officer and staff colleagues
- Staff associations.

None was seen to be a dominating influence but all were seen as being important to the future of the Special Constabulary. The most important of all of these are ACPO and the Home Office. Strong direction and support from ACPO, and ongoing financial, legislative and coordination support from the Home Office, are vital to success.

The key to success is using the Special Constabulary as a highly cost-effective resource that can be of outstanding value

03 Approach – Business Strategy Development Methods Applied to Policing



The approach was based on the assumption that the strategy should be high-level and kept to national policy. Local variations according to the needs of individual Forces had to be allowed, preferably within a firm national framework. Hard data would be used wherever it could be shown to be reliable and relevant. If possible we would use cost-benefit analysis to calculate the economic return on investment and justify

the plan. The plan must be robust enough to cope with foreseeable changes in structure.

The approach is one used in industry for business strategy development and this may be its first use in policing. The methodology used is shown and described in the diagram and text in Appendix II.

The approach is one used in industry for business strategy development and this may be its first use in policing

04 Unsatisfied or Partly-Satisfied Market Needs

The analysis of trends in demand for policing services was carried out using statistical data from the Home Office and other public sources. The objective was to identify where there were requirements that were either not being met or were being only partly met by existing service suppliers and were of real importance to the public. The following segments were seen as real priorities.

Crime Reduction/Public Reassurance – More Needs to be Done

Much is being done to reduce crime and the fear of crime. Considerable investment has been put into this segment, including substantial numbers of PCSOs, and more are being recruited to give a visible deterrent presence on the streets. The major Neighbourhood Policing initiative is being implemented nationally and this will also have an impact on public reassurance as dedicated teams of officers are assigned to each local area. However, the public perception (and the reality in many places) is that the police do not respond to what the service considers to be low-priority incidents. Details of complaints may be taken over the telephone or officers may respond hours or even days later while the complainer wants a personal response within a reasonable period of time. This is a major source of dissatisfaction and an unsatisfied demand.

Public Dissatisfaction with Investigation of Minor Crimes

Failing to investigate and clear up minor crimes is a major source of public dissatisfaction. In particular, the practice of issuing crime numbers over the telephone and failing to send officers to the scenes of minor crime is regularly criticised in the Press. It also appears to be the primary reason for low clear-up rates in many Forces. The detection rates for most types of serious crime are relatively high but minor crime tends to be either not investigated at all or given very limited attention. While prioritising the use of resources is an obvious and necessary approach, improving service by attending and investigating minor crimes would have a major impact on satisfaction rates and community relationships.

Re-offending Rates and Numbers Wanted on Warrant

There has been much recent publicity on the subject of offenders committing further crimes while on bail, and this is a cause of public concern and criticism. In addition, the number of outstanding arrest warrants has, in many cases, been increasing and allows these people to continue to re-offend before being brought to justice. The traditional practice of carrying out bail checks on the former, and actively working to trace the latter, has not been given a high priority in many Forces and additional resources focused on these two areas would be likely to increase public satisfaction levels.

Drink Driving Fatalities and Deterrents


Over the last few years there has been an upward trend in drink driving deaths and serious injuries. At the same time, the number of breath tests carried out by the Police has fallen dramatically – from about 800,000 ten years ago to fewer than 500,000 last year. It would appear that drink driving is on the increase and that more attention to the problem and more active policing would have a real impact on road safety.

Vehicle Safety and Roadworthiness

A national campaign in 2005 saw commercial vehicles stopped and checked over a period of weeks. Of the vehicles stopped and checked, 40% were committing offences of various types. The number of officers dedicated to roads policing has been reduced over the past ten years and while the Department of Transport has introduced vehicle inspectors their numbers and powers are limited. This is a major road safety issue and more resources would undoubtedly have a significant deterrent and detection impact.

The conclusion of the market demand analysis was that much is being done and real progress is being made in many areas. However, there appear to be key niches where more needs to be done. Putting more resource into these areas would be likely to have a significant impact on levels of public satisfaction and public safety.

Improving service by attending and investigating minor crimes would have a major impact on satisfaction rates



05_ The Starting Point – The Special Constabulary Now

All 43 forces in England and Wales were asked to provide data on their Special Constabularies. While few were able to provide all of the information requested, detailed answers were received from over 50%. That sample is statistically valid.

The statistics drawn from the survey were checked against Home Office data from other sources and the accuracy was considered high enough to be sufficiently reliable for the strategy development exercise.

The main findings from this analysis were:


- The number of Special Constables is now 14,021 – about 18% greater than when the Home Office funded capacity building programme started.
- 68% of Specials are male, 32% are female and 6% are from ethnic minorities – that compares with 79% male, 21% female and 3.5% from ethnic minorities amongst regular officers.
- The age distribution is reassuring and shows strength in the target groups – 2% of Specials are under 20 years old, 87% are between 21 and 50, and only 11% are over 50.
- The success of the recruitment campaign can be seen by the fact that 54% of Specials have less than 2 years' service, 17% have between 2 and 5 years, and 29% have more than 6 years' experience.
- The average Special provides 171 hours of duty (excluding training) per annum; however, this figure was considered to be low because of the proportion of officers being trained and tutored over the past two years.
- The average basic training period is 90 hours, but the variation between Forces was substantial with a range from 45 hours to over 200 hours.
- Ongoing training and development again varied between Forces, with some having a minimum of refresher training and some having a highly developed programme; the

average is 25 hours per officer per annum.


- The average turnover is 18% per annum, with one in five leavers joining the regular force; in other words, the average Special stays for about five years, but the impact on retention rates from the recent large growth in numbers from the recent recruitment campaign cannot yet be evaluated.
- Cost: from the information received from Forces it was calculated that the cost per duty hour of a Special was £3.43 in the first two years because of the cost of basic training and equipment, and just £2.40 per hour after that. The higher figure is about one-eighth of the Home Office estimate of the cost of a regular officer and about one-seventh of the estimated cost of a PCSO. The cost shown is the full cost of a Special and does not take into account the funding provided by the Home Office. The actual cost to individual Forces is even lower.

In summary, the analysis showed that the Special Constabulary has been highly successful in attracting and recruiting the type of people that better represent the communities they serve. The Home Office recruitment campaigns have been key to that success. The challenge now is to properly train and deploy these officers so they make a real difference to the community and get a high degree of job satisfaction. As the Special Constabulary grows, there will be increasing pressure for Specials to get more interesting and varied roles that fit their unique capabilities. The strategy aims to find these roles while ensuring that Specials are not in competition with other members of the policing family.

The Special Constabulary has been highly successful in recruiting the type of people that better represent the communities they serve



06_ The Special Constabulary Compared With Other Providers of Community Safety Services



The number of suppliers of service to this market has increased dramatically over the past few years and specialist, non-police units have been developed to address particular niches. This part of the study examined the strengths and weaknesses of the main suppliers of service, including the Special Constabulary. The chart below shows the primary factors considered and the respective positions of each of the suppliers included in the selected market segments. Note that the chart only relates to those activities and factors relevant to this study.

The main comparative strengths and weaknesses of the Special Constabulary were therefore deduced to be as follows.

Powers

The only groups having full police powers are Regular Officers and Special Constables. That means Specials can be deployed and can have an impact on far broader areas of public concern than all of the other groups apart from Regular Officers.

Availability

The fact that Specials are available at times that normally coincide with peak demand is a significant advantage. The downside is

that organising responses to planned and unplanned events that occur during the normal working day is more difficult for the Special Constabulary. Regulations allow Specials to be compensated if required for duty during the working day, but availability is still a limitation on deployment in anything less than major public emergencies.

Impact on Areas of Real Public Concern

The key strength of the Special Constabulary is its ability to deliver services in areas of real public concern. That is clearly the case now. If the deployment strategy recommended in this paper is implemented across Forces, it is highly likely that public satisfaction with the police service will improve, and communication with harder-to-reach parts of the community will be enhanced.

Cost Effectiveness

The cost advantage of the Special Constabulary is huge. Specials are not free, in that they have to be recruited, trained (and updated), equipped and administered. However, the gross cost to Forces was calculated at approximately £3 per duty hour. That is a fraction of the full cost of a regular officer or a PCSO. At present the Special Constabulary is supported by a contribution

specifically given to support capacity building within Forces. The net cost per hour to individual Police Forces is therefore considerably lower than the rate shown

The primary conclusion of this part of the analysis was that the Special Constabulary has some real, practical advantages over other providers of service to community safety. When the economic case is considered the argument for growing the Special Constabulary and properly training and deploying it is overwhelming.

The key strength of the Special Constabulary is its ability to deliver services in areas of real public concern

	Regular Officers	Special Constables	PCSOs	HA Traffic Officers	Vehicle Inspectorate
Have full police powers	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Available daytime	Yes	Limited	Yes	Yes	Yes
Available nights and weekends	Yes	Yes	Limited	Limited	Limited
Reduce crime by patrolling and responding to incidents	Yes	Yes	Contribute	No	No
Reassure public through high-visibility patrolling	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
Investigate crime and detect offenders	Yes	Possible	Contribute	No	No
Reduce re-offending through bail checks and exercising warrants	Yes	Yes	Contribute	No	No
Reduce vehicle crime by ANPR and vehicle checkpoint stops	Yes	Yes	Contribute	No	Contribute

07 Target Niches for the Special Constabulary

The analysis described above shows that the Special Constabulary is a valuable and highly cost-effective resource capable of being deployed into areas of significant public concern.

Specials already add significant value in the community, but could do even more if focused on certain service niches of real importance to the community where current levels of satisfaction are not high enough. The areas identified as fitting best with the market demand and the strengths of the Special Constabulary are outlined below.

It is important to stress that while these 'target niches' have been identified from an overall analysis of the market need for police services, five of the seven focus areas described below fit firmly within the neighbourhood policing strategy being implemented now. They strongly contribute towards the neighbourhood policing objectives of tackling crime and the fear of crime, and bringing the police service closer to the communities they serve. Integrating the planning and deployment of the Special Constabulary into the neighbourhood policing strategy in each Force will maximise the benefit to the community while ensuring that Specials have a real and differentiated role and job satisfaction. The other two focus areas are national priorities and are not, strictly speaking, part of the neighbourhood policing agenda. The National Neighbourhood Policing Programme directorate has been consulted and considers the recommended balance of priorities for the Special Constabulary to be balanced and appropriate.

It must be emphasised that regional variations in demand and local priorities will inevitably mean that few Police Forces could or should deploy Specials in every one of the niches described here. No national strategy can fit every local need. Individual Police Forces are encouraged to consider the deployment of their Specials into the areas recommended here and to select those that fit closest with local needs. Forces may find the methodology described in this Report

useful in setting deployment strategies for their Specials where the need is substantially different to that identified below. Where such differences exist Police Forces will be expected to demonstrate that their Special Constabularies have been properly tasked and deployed into demand niches where they can add most value.

Crime Reduction

This includes uniform patrol to act as a deterrent and to deal with crime as it arises. It also covers responding to incidents, in accordance with the level of training of individuals and, where relevant, their driving qualifications. Note that slow response to incidents is a major cause of public dissatisfaction and the use of Specials in this role can reduce response times provided they are properly trained and equipped. In addition to traditional uniform duties, however, it is recommended that Specials be deployed to check that persistent offenders are complying with bail conditions. This simple discipline may reduce the rate of re-offending and will, at the minimum, provide valuable intelligence to assist in the solving of crime. Similarly, Specials can be tasked with tracing and arresting offenders wanted on warrant. Bringing offenders to justice impacts crime and strengthens public support for the police.

Public Reassurance

This is the traditional role of the constable and involves street patrol, group deployment in known problem areas, and responding to incidents as they arise. Tasking for Specials should be intelligence-led in the same way as for Regular Officers. The development of the use of PCSOs for this task does not negate the value of the Special Constabulary in this area of deployment, but care needs to be taken to

Slow response to incidents is a major cause of public dissatisfaction and the use of Specials in this role can reduce response times provided they are properly trained and equipped





avoid duplication of resource and under-utilisation of the powers and training of Special Constables.

Attendance at and Investigation of Minor Crimes

It is standard practice in many Forces to have minor crimes investigated on a trend basis. Incidents may be recorded over the telephone and may not have an officer assigned to visit complainants and investigate the individual crimes. While the public generally understands the need for prioritisation of resources, there is no doubt that failing to visit the scenes of minor crimes and actively to investigate them is a major source of dissatisfaction. Special Constables normally live in the communities they serve and may be well placed to investigate and solve minor crimes if trained to do so. Allocating trained Special Constables to this task in sufficient numbers could have a high impact on levels of public satisfaction with the Police.

Anti-social Behaviour

While anti-social behaviour can occur at any time there is a particular problem with the public believing that parts of their local area are dangerous in the evening, especially at weekends. Special Constables can be used in groups with a suitably trained supervisor and appropriate transportation for themselves and prisoners to tackle this problem. Given that the availability of most Specials matches the need for service, this is a natural priority for the Special Constabulary.

Note that some Police Forces are now training and using Special Constables for Level II Public Order deployments. While this is not a requirement in all Forces, consideration should be given to training Specials in Public Order techniques where the demand justifies the investment.

Roads Policing – Drink Driving and Vehicle Checks

The market analysis showed that drink driving is not declining, while the number

of breath tests carried out by police is considerably lower than it was in the past. There is a clear need for the police to carry out more breath tests. In parallel, there is evidence of an increasing number of vehicles being driven on roads while in an unroadworthy condition or without the required documentation for drivers and/or their vehicles. This has significant implications for community safety, and if additional resources were deployed it is highly likely that the number of offenders caught would increase and deaths and injuries would be reduced. This in turn would almost certainly have a deterrent effect and may contribute further to road safety.

Special Constables are already trained to identify and deal with minor traffic offences, check vehicle and driver documentation, and administer breath tests. Some basic training in the identification of simple vehicle defects could also be given so that Specials could correctly assess when qualified vehicle examiners from Roads Policing

Units should be called to carry out full examinations. Specials could be deployed at static vehicle check points and backed by a pursuit team to deal with any vehicle failing to stop, or could be deployed as mobile units if suitably trained.

Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR)

The government is investing substantial sums to increase the use of ANPR to deny criminals the use of the road system and to improve detection rates and intelligence. It is likely that the capability of this equipment exceeds the availability of resources to stop and check vehicles producing a match to a wanted vehicle. Specials could easily be trained to operate mobile, but stationary, ANPR units located at points where vehicles could be easily and safely stopped. With suitable training Specials could also be used to crew mobile patrol units equipped with ANPR and to stop vehicles flagged by the system as wanted.

Critical Incidents

The unpredictable nature of major incidents means that additional resources are required quickly for security cordons, assistance to the other emergency services, identification of survivors and victims, protection and cataloguing of property, and so on. The Special Constabulary is an obvious source of additional resource, provided officers are trained to contribute and their full-time employers will release them. Training for major incidents is the responsibility of each Force.

Encouraging employers to release Special Constables for duty may be easier if Forces use their power under regulations to compensate Specials when they lose earnings as a result of being called out of duty, but improving communication with employers is a priority. The Home Office is providing support and funding for programmes to engage employers in those Forces that submitted suitable business cases.

Specials could easily be trained to operate mobile, but stationary, ANPR units located at points where vehicles could be easily and safely stopped

08 Return on Investment – Performance Measurement

The Home Office and NPIA from 1 April 2007 have invested considerable amounts in the development of the Special Constabulary and in most Forces this has been matched with local funding.

It is right and proper that all sides should be able to measure the return on that investment. On an ongoing basis, Forces and the Home Office should monitor performance to ensure that the excellent value that the Special Constabulary offers is being optimised at Force level and nationally.

The performance measurement factors recommended by the Working Group are split into two groups. The first group describes the information required by the Home Office and NPIA to ensure that funds provided centrally are being properly and efficiently used to grow the size and capability of the Special Constabulary. The second group of factors are those recommended to Forces to measure the effectiveness of the deployment of their Specials. There is no requirement for reporting to the NPIA for any items in the second group and Forces can choose whether they wish to record and use the data.

Group 1 – Information Required by the Home Office – Establishment and Utilisation

- Number of SCs – trend over past three years (using closing numbers at 31 March each year and current number at end of reporting periods).
- Proportion of SCs to regular officers (target minimum of 10%).
- Turnover – joiners and leavers as a percentage of total numbers, leavers split between those transferring to the regulars and those leaving the service.
- Number of hours worked, split between

training and duty.

- Gender and ethnic background as well as disability and sexual orientation.

Group 2 – Performance Measurement Factors Recommended to Forces

Performance by Special Constabulary:

- Number of incidents where lead unit is SC.
- Number of incidents where SC is allocated support to lead unit.
- Number of arrests.
- Number of process files.
- Number of Crime Reports.
- Number and value of Fixed Penalties issued for non-Road Traffic offences.
- Number and value of Fixed Penalties issued for Road Traffic offences.
- Number of Stops/Searches under S1 PACE or S44 Terrorism Act.
- Number of Check Visits to Licensed Premises.

Discipline and Welfare:

- Number of assaults on SCs.
- Number of non-assault injuries to SCs on duty.
- Days' work lost through assault or other injury on duty (relates to their full-time employment).
- Number of complaints against SCs, and their disposal (outstanding at period end, substantiated, withdrawn, no case to answer).
- Number of SCs being required to resign or dismissed for performance or discipline reasons.

Costs:

- Amount spent on recruitment (before Home Office grant)
- Amount spent on equipment.
- Amount spent on training.
- Amount spent on expenses and allowances.

It has been agreed with HM Inspector of Constabulary that the effective use of the Special Constabulary will form part of the baseline assessment of Force performance. It is recommended that the performance measures outlined above be used to ensure active management of this valuable and highly cost-effective resource.

Forces and the Home Office should monitor performance to ensure that the excellent value that the Special Constabulary offers is being optimised

09 Implementing the Strategy

The implementation plan for the strategy is still under development and will be finalised when the strategy has been reviewed and approved by ACPO and the Home Office and communicated to other key stakeholders. The main elements of the implementation plan, and principles, are shown in Appendix III.

Implementation Costs

Following questions raised at the ACPO Cabinet Meeting in September 2006, a sub-committee of the Strategy Working Group met with the Home Office to consider the costs of implementing the recommendations in this paper. It was concluded that the costs would be minimal. Almost all of the investment required is in training and the management of change. The former can be delivered at almost no cost because all of the training material already exists and is used by Forces for training regular officers. The management of change can be provided through the existing Special Constabulary management structure. The Special Constabulary has many members with

advanced business skills and experience, and these can be made available at no cost.

Given the economic advantages of the Special Constabulary over every other Public Sector resource working for public safety and reassurance, it continues to represent the best return on investment available in policing.

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Appendix I

Factors taken into account in developing strategy

Police Reform

The police service has in recent years undergone significant change driven by the government's Police Reform Agenda. These reforms have driven cultural and operational change throughout the organisation. The Working Group considered the direction and priorities of these changes in arriving at its recommendations.

Other Suppliers of Policing Services

The Special Constabulary is an integral part of the police service and must change and adapt quickly to ensure it continues to meet the internal and external demands and expectations of stakeholders. The reality is that the police service now operates in a competitive, performance-driven arena with multiple suppliers of service and many demands on the funds available. PCSOs, Highways Agency Traffic Officers, Community Wardens, Registered Security Staff, Vehicle Inspectorate Officers and others are all playing an increasing role in areas previously the exclusive preserve of the police officers. In this increasingly complex mix the role of the Special Constabulary needs to be clear and unambiguous, and preferably properly differentiated, so as to have a clear purpose.

New Elements of the National Policing Strategy

The Government's strategy for policing contains a number of key initiatives that affect the delivery of services to the communities they serve – people and businesses. The initiative that has the biggest impact on the Special Constabulary is the Neighbourhood Policing commitment. That will see specialist teams created in every geographic Basic Command Unit, focused on identifying and resolving community safety, security and quality-of-life issues in so far as they relate to law enforcement. The Special Constabulary has a key role to play in this initiative, but a clear and differentiated set of responsibilities needs to be identified if proper value is to be delivered and motivation of the volunteers involved maintained and developed.

While Neighbourhood Policing is a key priority, it has to be recognised that other areas of real public concern, such as the quality of response to calls for police action and the investigation of crime, are an integral part of the strategy. The Special Constabulary has a wider role to play than high-visibility patrol, and the potential breadth of capability of the Special Constabulary is a significant asset.

New Technology

The use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) systems to track criminals and affect their apprehension is a key element in the strategy to deny criminals the use of the main road network. While significant investment is being made in the technology, few Forces are allocating additional resources to the task of tracking and stopping vehicles flagged for action.

The Airwaves Communication System is a potential breakthrough in police communications and allows, amongst many other advantages, the ability to communicate between officers from different Forces when they are deployed on the same task or operate within the same geographical area. Mutual support in the case of a major event or emergency becomes far easier. The changes in legislation currently going through Parliament will remove the geographic limits placed on the Special Constabulary and allow far wider deployments for mutual aid where required for major events or incidents.



Appendix II

Diagram and description of methodology

The methodology was adapted from a standard strategy development model used in business. It is shown in the diagram below.



The main elements of the methodology are described in the following sections to explain the rigour that was applied to the study.

Market for Policing Services

This was an overall appraisal of the demands on the police service now and as predicted to develop over the next five years. It covered:

- **Market segmentation** the logical split of types of service demand; determining the best ways to look at demand in an organised structure – for service type it considered, for example: reassurance patrol, crime prevention, minor crime detection, major crime detection, minor public order, major public order, roads policing, etc. The other primary segment is geographic, and demand was considered in different types of community and different regions – for example: anti-terrorism

will be a stronger need in London than in counties, as a rule; poaching is a problem in rural communities but is unusual in urban conurbations.

- **Market characteristics** for each segment, the key factors driving demand for resources and the projected trends (growing demand, static demand, shrinking demand). One factor that needed to be considered for each segment was the timing of demand, to recognise the fact that SCs operate mainly during the evening and weekend.
- **Competitor analysis** the Special Constabulary doesn't have competitors as such, but there are other agencies that do what the SC can do, or parts of it. In this section the roles of the Regular Force, PCSOs, the security industry and other providers of service to the segments defined above were examined. Their characteristics were then mapped each against the different segments to see where their focus lies.

Their 'ability to compete' with each other and with the SC was then evaluated. This wasn't done in order to get into competition, but to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the SC in each segment compared to other current and potential service providers. That allows the Working Group to focus on under-resourced segments where the Special Constabulary could be as strong or stronger and as or more cost-effective than other providers.

Current Position of the SC

An analysis was carried out into the current strengths and weaknesses of the Special Constabulary in all of the market segments where it operates now, or in which it might operate. For this the Working Group requested and received from Forces around the country:

- Numbers of officers by region, age band, experience band, gender and ethnic origin.

- Performance statistics where available – at the minimum numbers of hours worked, by Region.
- Competency levels, as defined by training, deployment and experience – by region the length of basic training, the number of officers certified for independent patrol, and the number of officers with advanced and specialist training.
- Current deployments, mapping these against the segments that were defined in the early stage of the exercise.
- Reputation – where available, views and comments from stakeholders such as government, ACPO, Association of Police Authorities, the press etc, were collected and reviewed. This helped identify marketing needs and any segments where the credibility gap was too wide to bridge (considering segments that were seen to be attractive to the SC but where its reputation would make it difficult to gain access).

Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT)

- The strengths of the SC in relation to the market opportunity were assessed. These were then categorised into whether they were ‘enablers’ (things needed just to be able to operate in the market) or ‘differentiators’ (things that make the Special Constabulary better than the other service providers).
- The weaknesses were sorted according to whether they were ‘permanent’ (things that can’t be easily changed) or ‘temporary’ (things that could be changed within a 12-month period).
- Threats from external and internal sources were listed, and ‘other players’ in the market as threats, opportunities or neither. Other threats were rated on a one-to-five scale, with one being a minor threat and five being critical.
- Market needs by segment were deduced from the segmentation analysis, opportunities being both current and

future. They were rated on a one-to-five scale in order of need, with one being low and five high.

Selection of Target Segments and Niches

- Taking those segments rated as four or five on the need scale, the Working Group evaluated the Special Constabulary’s ability to compete by reference to the strengths and weaknesses of the individual service suppliers. This was done using the same one-to-five scale; one being low capability to service that niche, five being the best placed to service the niche.
- Those segments/niches that are rated high on need and high on ability to compete were designated as ‘target segments’ and these became the primary, short-term targets.
- As a check exercise the Working Group re-examined those other segments/niches that were considered high demand, and re-examined the ability of the Special Constabulary to compete if funding, training or any other limiting factors were changed.
- The segments/niches that were to be recommended as the main focus for the Special Constabulary were selected.

Action Plan and Economic Justification

- Taking the selected segments/niches and determining what actions, what resources and what funding would be necessary to ensure success in these areas, the cost of implementation was considered to see if any segments could be ruled out on a cost basis.
- The cost of the main elements of implementation was considered so that the plan could be adjusted if necessary plan for funding and resource constraints. The Working Group was looking to identify the ‘limiting factor’ – the first constraint to bite and stop further development.

- The benefits that would derive from the successful implementation of the action plan, and the return on investment have been considered but require further study. The risks (economic, technical and political) to the plan have been considered and the overall risk of the strategy (but not individual operations within the strategy) is considered to be low.
- The implementation plans for each element of the strategy and the overall plan are described in this document. Milestones and achievement dates will be used to provide a measure of progress in implementation.
- The best grouping of implementation projects, the organisation of the project team, the allocation responsibility/accountability and authority levels that should be balanced with responsibilities are all under consideration at this point.

Communicating the Strategy and Securing Support

- The representatives of the main stakeholders within the Special Constabulary were consulted at the National Conference in Chester in March and were unanimously supportive.
- The ACPO representative for the Special Constabulary, Mr Peter Fahy, Chief Constable of Cheshire Constabulary, has been consulted at various stages throughout the process and has declared his support.
- The Home Office Police Volunteers Unit has been involved throughout the process and has also declared its support. However, with the implementation of the NPIA in April 2007 this work has been taken forward by the NPIA Workforce Strategy Unit; who are equally supportive of this project.

This document will be the main method of communicating the strategy to other stakeholders and to the general public.



Appendix III

Implementation Plan – Key Elements



Recruitment

The success of the Capacity Building project has demonstrated what can be achieved with focus and investment. The recent decision to continue funding by the NPIA for recruitment and training until 31 March 2008 means that Forces have the opportunity to continue recruiting Special Constables. Experience to date suggests that volunteering is again becoming attractive to large sections of the community. Momentum needs to be maintained to counter attrition rates of about 18% per annum and to increase numbers further.

The most urgent requirement is the standardisation of recruitment standards, especially in respect of aptitude and fitness testing. Not only would common standards make management of the recruitment process easier for candidates and Forces, but it would simplify the process of transferring Special Constables between Forces when they relocate for personal reasons.

Training and Development

The amount of basic training given to Special Constables varies greatly from Force to Force and there is no common minimum number of hours and no standard curriculum. There are clear implications for quality of service, reputation and the relationship with regular colleagues, and it is recommended that common standards are established so that all Special Constables in England and Wales meet an agreed minimum standard of competence.

It is also recommended that Special Constables are given the appropriate qualification for the training that they receive. There is considerable waste in retraining Special Constables who transfer to the Regular Force or who transfer to another Special Constabulary. Issuing certificates for successful completion of standard training modules would improve efficiency and motivation.

The basic material is in place. The Initial Police Learning and Development Programme (IPLDP), commenced on 1 April 2006 along with the Specials Professional Development Scheme (SPDS), gives the Special Constable a professional standard. These need to be incorporated into a clear policy on training for Special Constables.

The strategy recommended for the Special Constabulary envisages Specials undertaking some specialist roles, such as the investigation of minor crimes. It is recommended that training modules be prepared centrally for each of the agreed target areas so that Special Constables allocated to these roles can be easily and quickly trained to the required standard.

Leadership

It is almost universally acknowledged that volunteers are best managed by volunteers. However, this will only hold true if all of those involved with the leadership and management of Specials act in a professional manner. The impact of both good and poor leadership and management will be reflected in officer retention and

in the overall performance of the Special Constabulary. Many people who join the Specials already have experience of leading and managing in their own organisations and may therefore be fully competent in this aspect. Others aspire to improve themselves and take on additional responsibility. The modular leadership development training available to regular officers should be made available to suitable Special Constabulary supervisors.

Human Resource Management

While it is recognised that all forces have their own best practice and policies it is the purpose of this document to highlight issues relating to recruitment, training, welfare and retention of Special Constables. The quality of HR management can have a disproportionate impact on the performance of all personnel not just volunteers; therefore it is imperative that Forces consider all their HR policies for the impact on their Special Constables and adapt where necessary and appropriate. Good practice exists in many Forces and where it is evident the positive benefits can be seen in motivation and retention. Those involved with the management of Specials should be made aware (if they are not already) of the different needs and support (from paid employees) that may be required to enable full engagement of this valuable resource.

Marketing

The importance of marketing the Special Constabulary cannot be over-emphasised and this should be the subject of central support from the Home Office and NPIA and local support from each Force. Marketing should be based on demonstrating three key elements: product, features and benefits. This strategy should also identify the key stakeholders in their business; these will include:

- Potential recruits
- Local communities
- Employers
- Home Office
- NPIA
- Police Authority
- Chief Officer Groups
- BCU Command Teams
- Police Staff
- Special Constables
- Others, including staff associations.

The relevance of these three elements (product, features and benefits) will need to be varied according to individual stakeholder needs; for example the Home Office will be interested in performance-related data and outcomes, whereas potential recruits will be looking for information concerning the role and reality of life as a Special.

Any worthwhile marketing strategy should also include arrangements for communicating and must not ignore existing Specials who are often excluded (although not intentionally) from Force announcements. Where best practice exists this will ensure publications such as Annual Policing Plans, Chief Constable Reports, Police Authority Reports etc. are inclusive of their Special Constabulary.

Coordination of Implementation Elements

It is intended to maintain the Strategy Working Group throughout the implementation process so as to provide continuity and momentum. A separate Implementation Plan will be prepared for discussion and agreement with ACPO and the Home Office. That will contain actions, responsibilities, timescales, milestones and the progress monitoring process.

Implementation Costs

Following questions raised at the ACPO Cabinet Meeting in September 2006, a sub-committee of the Strategy Working Group met with the Home Office to consider the costs of implementing the recommendations in this paper. It was concluded that the costs would be minimal. Almost all of the investment required is in training and the management of change. The former can be delivered at almost no cost because all of the training material already exists and is used by Forces for training regular officers. The management of change can be provided through the existing Special Constabulary management structure. The Special Constabulary has many members with advanced business skills and experience, and these can be made available at no cost.

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Appendix IV

Strategy working group members

ACPO Lead	Peter Fahy, Chief Constable, Cheshire Police
Home Office	Mark Stephenson, Police Human Resources Unit Peter Brown, Police Human Resources Unit
HMIC	Clare Simon, Specialist Staff Officer
Neighbourhood Policing Programme	Jason Masters, Staff Officer
Special Constabulary	Martin Ashburn, Suffolk Steve Baker, Surrey Ivan Bamford, Derbyshire Buster Brown, Devon & Cornwall David Burgess-Joyce, Merseyside Neil Burnett, West Mercia Nigel Green, Bedfordshire Peter Howells, Gwent Ian Miller, City of London John Pritchard, Nottinghamshire Alan Richards South Yorkshire Paul Robinson, Merseyside Paul Smith, Leicestershire